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Judicial Practice Makes Perfect: Explaining Asylum Recognition in the European
Union
Abstract
Vast disparities in asylum recognition rates have persisted in the European Union despite legislative
efforts to standardize the asylum determination process. National judiciaries play an important role in
this process and scholars mostly agree that differences in judicial practice pose a challenge to the
harmonization of recognition rates. However, no study has specifically analyzed the relationship between
these two variables. The aim of this research is to determine whether differences in judicial practice
account for the variation in asylum recognition rates in the EU. To observe these differences, precedent
relating to three areas of the refugee determination process is identified in selected EU states. Application
of this precedent is then analyzed in order to identify restrictive judicial practices. Analyses reveal that
differences in judicial practice impact the outcomes of asylum cases, and therefore recognition rates.

This article is available in Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/
respublica/vol20/iss1/8

20 RES PUBLICA
	
  
JUDICIAL PRACTICE MAKES PERFECT:
EXPLAINING ASYLUM RECOGNITION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Casey Plach
Abstract: Vast disparities in asylum recognition rates have persisted in the European
Union despite legislative efforts to standardize the asylum determination process.
National judiciaries play an important role in this process and scholars mostly agree that
differences in judicial practice pose a challenge to the harmonization of recognition
rates. However, no study has specifically analyzed the relationship between these two
variables. The aim of this research is to determine whether differences in judicial
practice account for the variation in asylum recognition rates in the EU. To observe
these differences, precedent relating to three areas of the refugee determination process
is identified in selected EU states. Application of this precedent is then analyzed in order
to identify restrictive judicial practices. Analyses reveal that differences in judicial
practice impact the outcomes of asylum cases, and therefore recognition rates.
INTRODUCTION
In a 2004 press release, the European Council on Refugees & Exiles explained,
“seeking asylum in Europe remains a dangerous lottery, with a person facing widely
differing chances of receiving adequate treatment and a fair outcome depending in which
European country they seek asylum.”49 Variation in asylum recognition rates among
European Union (EU) countries illustrates this disparate treatment. For example, in 2013
the United Kingdom granted protection to 29% of asylum applicants, while recognition
rates in Spain and Ireland remained much lower, at 9% and 7% respectively.50 Clearly,
those who flee persecution and seek refuge in Europe face unequal treatment and
inconsistent odds for protection.
In order to address these inconsistencies, the United Nations High Commission
for Refugees (UNHCR) and the European Union have responded in a number of ways.
Acknowledging the significant role of national courts in the refugee determination
process, both the EU and the UNHCR have set more specific standards for judiciaries to
determine who should be granted protection. Guidelines published by the UNHCR are
not binding, but regulations passed by the European Union require state compliance. One
piece of EU legislation that binds all member states (with the exception of Denmark) is
49
50

Europe Must End Asylum Lottery 2004
“UNHCR Population Statistics”

RES PUBLICA 21
	
  
the Qualification Directive, which sets minimum standards for qualification as a refugee.
However, despite these efforts to harmonize legal standards, recognition rates remain
highly inconsistent. This suggests that changes in law are not sufficient to ensure
harmonization and that the real barrier to harmonized recognition rates is the application
and interpretation of that law.
The aim of this research is to determine whether judicial practice accounts for the
variation in asylum recognition rates in the EU. Precedent relating to the refugee
determination process is identified and application of this precedent is analyzed to
determine how restrictive judicial practice is in selected EU states. Overall, it is
hypothesized that states with restrictive judicial practices will have lower asylum
recognition rates than states that apply more liberal asylum determination processes.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Empirical research on asylum recognition rates began in the early 1990s, at about
the same time the European Union initiated efforts to harmonize asylum policy in the
region. While some scholars considered questions of convergence of recognition rates in
the European Union, others analyzed the variation in recognition rates and some even
extended their studies to countries outside of the EU. These studies all rely on the
assumption that the merit of individual claims cannot account for such a high level of
variation in recognition rates. To explain this variation, other factors are tested, with a
strong focus on economic and political conditions in both the origin and destination
countries of asylum applicants.
Scholars have mixed opinions regarding the effect of economic conditions on
recognition rates. Neumayer analyzes whether recognition rates in Western Europe
converge over the period of 1980-1999 and finds that certain economic variables in the
origin country and destination country are significant. Specifically, he finds that
recognition rates are lower among applicants from economically poor countries.51
Concerning economic conditions in the destination country, he finds that rates are lower
when unemployment is high and that countries with higher GDPs have lower recognition
rates.52 However, other studies find that the relationship between unemployment rates
51
52
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and recognition rates is weak at best and there is limited support for Neumeyer’s other
findings.53 With such mixed results, it is clear that economic factors can explain only a
small piece of the puzzle.
There is slightly more agreement on the effect that political factors have on
recognition rates. It is well established that political conditions in origin countries matter.
Neumayer finds that recognition rates are influenced by “political conditions in origin
countries in terms of regime type, extent of human rights violations, interstate conflict,
political conflict and events of genocide and politicide.”54 Kate’s findings support these
results.55 There is slightly less consensus on the effect of political conditions in
destination countries. Neumayer does not find a relationship between ideology in the
destination country and recognition rates, but Kate finds that countries that are
traditionally more left-wing have lower recognition rates.56 No study has found a
significant relationship between the electoral success of radical right populist parties and
recognition rates.57
From these studies it can be concluded that certain political factors are strong
determinants of whether or not an asylum seeker will be granted protection, while
economic factors are not as significant. Still, economic and political factors do not
completely solve the puzzle. Some scholars have expanded upon existing research and
studied the relationship between legal conditions and recognition rates, but overall this
variable has not received as much attention as economic and political ones. Considering
asylum decisions take place in a judicial setting, it is surprising that legal conditions have
not been given more attention. Sicakkan studies the effect of legal and institutional
frames of asylum determination on recognition rates, and concludes that, for higher
recognition rates to ensue, decision-making authority should be shared with external
actors that promote and implement fair practices in the courtroom, such as the UNHCR
and NGOs.58 Kate looks more closely at domestic law and attempts to measure its effect

53
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on recognition rates. She outlines four areas where judicial interpretation of the UN
refugee definition differs: burden of proof, persecution of non-state actors, internal flight
alternative, and the meaning of “particular social group.”59 However, noting difficulties
in interpreting legal rulings, she only tests the interpretation of persecution of non-state
actors and suggests that further research on judicial practice and domestic law would be
beneficial.
International relations theory indicates that the role of domestic institutions, such
as judicial bodies, does, in fact, matter. Harold Koh, along with other transnational legal
process theorists, focuses on the internalization of international norms in the domestic
legal structure. One specific type of internalization is legal internalization, which occurs
“when an international norm is incorporated into the domestic legal system through
executive action, judicial interpretation, legislative action, or some combination of the
three.”60 In the case of asylum and refugee law, states are bound by the Refugee
Convention and are influenced by additional forms of soft law. However, national courts
adjudicate asylum claims and must apply and interpret international law. As seen in the
EU, states may change their domestic law to meet international and regional standards,
but full compliance only occurs when norms are internalized, which falls on the
responsibility of the courts.
Gregory Noll has placed Koh’s legal process theory in the refugee law context
and argues that judicial interpretation is a significant factor in the variation of recognition
rates in the EU.61 He explains, “Rationally, one would expect that all Member states
should answer the question ‘who is a refugee?’ or ‘who is a beneficiary of extraterritorial
protection?’ in roughly the same manner” and lists three reasons for why this is the
case.62 First, all Member States are party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and therefore
operate under the same international legal standards. Second, all Member States are
signatories to the Dublin Convention which subjects them to the same regional criteria.
Third, the harmonization efforts by the EU should have resulted in a convergence of
recognition rates because it discouraged competition. Despite these conditions,
59
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recognition rates remain inconsistent. Offering an explanation to this puzzle, Noll states,
“…it must be concluded that the interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention…var(ies)
to a substantial degree among Member States.”63 Noll’s conclusion suggests that
domestic practices are a strong determinant of recognition rates and that there would be
value in examining differences in judicial interpretation.
Recent studies support Noll’s conclusion and further investigate the differences in
judicial practice. According to Hathaway, judges have played a significant role in the
development of refugee law. He states, “It was the judges of the world who led the way
in developing refugee law to respond to changed circumstances … a body of law which
was traditionally very much the province of UNHCR and academics has, over the course
of the last decade, become fundamentally judicialized.”64 This suggests that the judiciary
has had power in shaping international norms relating to asylum. Supporting Hathaway’s
claim, Hélène Lambert explains, “EU states have committed themselves to greater
harmonization of their national laws on asylum, but interpretation and application of
these new EC laws depend to a large extent on national judiciaries.”65 Similarly, Nergis
Canefe states, “In so many areas of refugee law and policy, the viability of a universal
commitment to protection is challenged by divergences in state practice as far as the
implementation and application of the 1951 Refugee Convention is considered.”66
Therefore, judicial practice is important because if judges are interpreting international
law differently or are not applying it at all, vast differences in recognition rates should
result.
Certain aspects of the refugee determination process have received much attention
in the literature because they are highly disputed among states. Article 1:A (2) of the
1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as:
[A]ny person who…owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who,
63
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not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to return to it.67
As explained in this definition, every applicant must prove a well-founded fear of
persecution. This refers to the standard of proof and threshold asylum seekers must meet
to obtain protection. As one of the more ambiguous phrases in the definition, wellfounded fear is open to interpretation, leading many scholars to analyze this concept.68
Establishing well-founded fear is crucial to every asylum case and is therefore included
as an independent variable in this study. Another phrase in this definition that is also open
to interpretation is “particular social group.” In her 2012 study, Michelle Foster analyzes
jurisprudential developments relating to this phrase and argues no other Convention
ground “has been subject to the degree of rigorous scrutiny, debate, and conflicting
interpretive approaches as the most nebulous of grounds.”69 It appears that this too is
critical to the asylum determination process and is also included as an independent
variable in this study. Finally, the last variable, also debated among states, is internal
protection alternative. While not mentioned in the refugee definition, this “notion was
developed in a somewhat ad hoc manner through international and intergovernmental
policy statements.”70 The process for determining whether an internal protection
alternative is available to an asylum applicant varies among states.71
Of all the studies reviewed, none seek to draw a causal relationship between
judicial interpretation and the variation in recognition rates in the EU. The central
purpose of this study is to examine such a relationship by analyzing case law in selected
EU states. Because the three identified independent variables are among the most highly
contested aspects of the asylum determination process, they are studied to determine how
restrictive the judicial interpretation is in each state, and subsequently, how that impacts
recognition rates. It is hypothesized that states in which courts have established more
restrictive practices relating to well-founded fear of persecution, internal protection
67
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alternative, and membership of a particular social group will have low asylum
recognition rates.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
In order to test the hypothesis outlined above, this study analyzes judicial practice
in three selected EU states: the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Spain. The United
Kingdom generally has high asylum recognition rates, while Ireland and Spain remain
much less willing to grant protection. The analysis of judicial practice within these states
attempts to explain why there is such a difference in recognition rates. Three categories
of the refugee determination process are analyzed: well-founded fear of persecution,
internal protection alternative, and membership of a particular social group. Due to the
EU Qualification Directive, which set standards on how to determine refugee status and
required states to transpose these standards into their national law, legislation appears
similar among states. Therefore, an analysis of differences in national law is not
sufficient in drawing a causal connection between domestic practice and recognition
rates. Furthermore, an examination of judicial precedent reveals that, in most cases,
precedent is similar among courts so this is also not an appropriate measure. Therefore, a
more thorough analysis of judicial decision-making is required. This is where judicial
practice comes in, which, for the purposes of this study, is defined as the application of
law and method of reasoning a court uses in order to come to a ruling. As such, particular
attention is given to the steps justices take in determining whether an applicant should be
granted protection, as well as the reasoning behind their rulings. Judicial practice is
considered restrictive when justices consistently rely on specific aspects of the law or one
method of reasoning to deny asylum applications. Additionally, judicial practice is
considered restrictive when justices appear distrustful of asylum applicants and do not
perform a complete, individual assessment.
Case law is the central data source used in this study. Using the Refworld case
law database (managed by the UNHCR) and RefLAW database (managed by the
University of Michigan Law School), ten cases are selected at random from each country.
Only decisions from the High or Supreme Courts are reviewed in order to observe
precedent and standards set for lower courts. The Qualification Directive came into force
in October 2006, so cases are chosen from the years 2007-2012. A recast Qualification
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Directive (which set out more specific requirements for states) was passed and came into
force October 2013, but cases after this date are not reviewed because there is not enough
case law for a complete analysis.
Dependent Variable: Variation in Recognition Rates
The dependent variable of this study is the variation in asylum recognition rates.
Recognition rates are measured as the number of positive decisions divided by the
number of total decisions in a given year. For example, in 2013 the UK recognitions rate
was 29%, Spain was 9%, and Ireland was 7%.72 There are two forms of refugee
protection: Convention status and complementary protection status (also referred to as
humanitarian protection). Standards for meeting Convention status and the amount of
protection granted when a claim is successful are set by the UN Refugee Convention,
while complementary protection status is set by individual states. Because this study is
considering consistency (or lack of consistency) in judicial interpretation of international
or regional law, only the Convention status is considered in the recognition rate.
Independent Variables
Well-Founded Fear of Persecution. The first independent variable is well-founded fear,
which is related to the standard of proof set by states and the amount of evidence required
of an asylum applicant to persuade the judge that his or her fear of persecution is
legitimate. A common standard is not indicated in the Qualification Directive because
over time individual jurisdictions have created their own standards. Almost all states set
the threshold for standard of proof much lower than is required in civil or criminal cases
because of the difficulties refugees face in gathering evidence and support for their case.
Ireland and the UK use the standard that emerged in Ex parte Sivakumaran (1988): “[the]
appropriate test is ‘reasonable chance,’ ‘substantial grounds for thinking,’ or ‘serious
possibility.’”73 Similarly, Spain has a threshold of “reasonable degree of likelihood,”
which was established in Tribunal Supremo 1988 Aranzadi No. 514.74 The UNHCR
confirmed these standards, explaining “the applicant's fear should be considered wellfounded if he can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his country
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of origin has become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in the definition, or would
for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned there.”75
Due to the similar thresholds relating to standard of proof, precedent is more or
less the same in each state. However, how states determine whether there is a reasonable
degree of likelihood that persecution will occur upon return is very different, and this is
where judicial practice matters. Hathaway explains, “the concept of well founded fear of
persecution is generally accepted as involving a subjective perception of persecution or a
threat of persecution, and an objective element in a present or prospective risk of
persecution, with which the subjective perception is consistent and which is based on
available information of conditions in the state of origin.”76 In other words, the subjective
element is the applicant’s testimony of what occurred and the evidence she provides to
support her claim. The objective element is an analysis of the country of origin
information (COI), which comes in the form of reports and publications by governmental
and non-governmental organizations. The objective information verifies what the
applicant says to ensure that her claim is plausible in the context of her country of origin.
The use of each element is analyzed in the assessment of judicial practice to reveal how
restrictive the determination of well-founded is in each EU state.
Internal Protection Alternative. One of the most fundamental principles of international
refugee law is non-refoulement— a principle of customary international law which
“provides that no one shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee against his or her will, in
any manner whatsoever, to a territory where he or she fears threats to life or freedom.”77
State are bound by this principle, but may choose not to grant protection to an asylum
seeker if there is a safe location within his or her origin country. This location is called an
internal protection alternative (IPA), which is the second independent variable in this
study. The Qualification Directive addresses the determination of an IPA in Article 8:
1. As part of the assessment of the application for international protection,
Member States may determine that an applicant is not in need of international
protection if in a part of the country of origin there is no well-founded fear of

75
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being persecuted or no real risk of suffering serious harm and the applicant can
reasonably be expected to stay in that part of the country.
2. In examining whether a part of the country of origin is in accordance with
paragraph 1, Member States shall at the time of taking the decision on the
application have regard to the general circumstances prevailing in that part of the
country and to the personal circumstances of the applicant.78
Part one refers to the reasonableness of the IPA and part two describes how to determine
whether the IPA is reasonable. Ireland and the UK have transposed this law directly into
their national law, while Spain makes no reference to IPA determination in its national
law. The UNHCR offers further guidance on how to determine reasonableness. It asks,
“Can the claimant, in the context of the country concerned, lead a relatively normal life
without facing undue hardship? If not, it would not be reasonable to expect the person to
move there.”79 While precedent relating to IPA has not been developed in Spain, Ireland
and the UK have both adopted the UNHCR standard of “unduly harsh” and justices make
reference to it in their rulings. However, as in the example of well-founded fear,
determination of what constitutes an undue hardship differs among states. To determine
whether judicial practice is restrictive, this determination process is assessed.
Particular Social Group. According to the refugee definition, a refugee is any person who
is persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group, or political opinion. However, the “particular social group” (PSG) ground is vague
and there are no established guidelines on its meaning which is why it is included as the
final independent variable. In her comparative study, Foster differentiates between two
approaches to judicial interpretation of particular social group: protected
characteristics/ejusdem generis and social protection/sociological approach.80 The first
approach was established in the US Board of Immigration Appeals in Re Acosta in 1985,
where the BIA found “the well established doctrine of ejusdem generis, meaning literally,
‘of the same kind,’ to be most helpful in construing the phrase ‘membership of a
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particular social group.’”81 This test has developed through further case law and Foster
summarizes three requirements to constitute a PSG: innate or unchangeable
characteristic, characteristic fundamental to human dignity, and former status that is
unalterable due to its historical permanence.82 Contrarily, the social perception approach
developed in France. Foster lists the two criteria established in the French case Ourbih in
1997: “the existence of characteristics common to all members of the group and which
define the group in the eyes of the authorities in the country and of society in general.”83
This test focuses on how an applicant is perceived by others, while the protected
characteristics test focuses on qualities of an applicant that amount to protection.
The least restrictive approach to these tests is for a state to permit the use of
either, meaning that an applicant can satisfy either of the tests to gain PSG status. The
most restrictive approach would be for a state to require the satisfaction of both tests.
Interestingly, the language of the Qualification Directive indicates that both tests must be
satisfied because of the use of “and" in Article 10 Section 1 (d), which states:
A group shall be considered to form a particular social group where in particular:

—members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a common
background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so
fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to
renounce it, and

—that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is
perceived as being different by the surrounding society 84
However, Article 3 of the Qualification Directive permits states to adopt more favorable
standards, so not all states require both tests. Ireland has replaced “and” with “or,” in its
national law so that either test may be satisfied by an asylum applicant. This makes for a
less restrictive standard. Spain and the UK, on the other hand, have directly transposed
the Directive and, judging by the written law, both tests must be satisfied. However, in
the UK Lord Bingham overturned this notion in Fornah (2006). He stated,
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If, however, this article were interpreted as meaning that a social group should
only be recognized as a particular social group for the purposes of the Convention
if it satisfies the criteria in both of sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii), then in my opinion
it propounds a test more stringent than is warranted by international authority.85
This set the standard in the UK so that an asylum applicant may satisfy either test. The
UK is seemingly now on par with its Irish counterparts in terms of PSG determination.
There is no evidence, however, that Spain has lowered its standards from what is outlined
in domestic law. To observe judicial practice relating to particular social group,
application of the protected characteristics and social perception tests are analyzed.
ANALYSIS
Well-Founded Fear
Ireland. In Ireland, analyses reveal that judicial practice relating to well-founded fear is
often unfavorable toward asylum applicants. The court relies heavily on country of origin
information (COI) to emphasize existing outlets of protection in an applicant’s country of
origin and often emphasizes what applicants could have done before seeking international
protection. Protection was denied in multiple cases based on general conditions occurring
in an applicant’s country of origin. For example, in (Moldova) Applicant, a woman was
fleeing from domestic violence at the hands of her husband, and the Refugee Appeals
Tribunal ruled that the applicant did not “demonstrate to a reasonable degree of
likelihood that she is a refugee.” The Refugee Appeals Tribunal used COI to determine
that government assistance and Human Rights organizations were available in Moldova
and that it was the fault of the applicant for not utilizing these resources. Similar
situations occurred in C.I.A. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Anor
and (Nigeria) Applicant. In C.I.A., the court ruled that “the burden of proof rested on the
applicant to establish a well-founded fear of persecution and this threshold was not met in
the instant case.” The court stated, “the whole thrust of the country of origin information
indicates that there are grave societal difficulties for gays in Nigeria…However…there is
practically no evidence before the Tribunal member to show that any prosecutions were
taken.” Even though the applicant attested to persecution, the court denied the applicant’s
case because the COI indicated that persecution on the basis of sexual orientation is rare
85
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in Nigeria. In another case, (Nigeria) Applicant, the court dismissed the appeal, ruling
that “the objective element does not support the well-foundedness of this fear.” In this
case, the possibility of state protection was determined by analyzing the effectiveness of
the police force and the court ruled that, based on the COI, protection was available.
These three cases indicate that Ireland has a tendency to use COI against its
applicants to prevent them from reaching the burden of proof. Courts must consider COI
in order to check the subjective fear of the applicant, but Irish courts appears to rely very
heavily on COI, meaning that they make generalizations rather than looking at specific
situations. This observation is supported by the fact that three of the ten cases analyzed
were appealed based on complaints that COI was too strongly considered and a personal
assessment was not made (H.A.-R. and S.A.-R v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal and Another;
C.I.A. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Anor; W.M.M. v. Refugee
Appeals Tribunal and Another). Relatedly, in cases where COI demonstrates a very
serious situation of conflict and persecution, protection is more likely to be provided. For
example, in M.M.A. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Anor, a
Sudanese man was granted protection because COI very strongly supported his case.
However such cases are rare, and reliance on COI most often leads to unfavorable
conditions for applicants.
Lack of consideration of the subjective evidence provided by applicants indicates
that Irish courts approach their asylum applicants with caution and mistrust. This is
supported by certain comments Justices make in their assessments. For example, in
(Moldova) Applicant, the court spent much of its ruling focusing of what the applicant
could have done. Although the applicant sought police assistance at the local level, she
did not seek protection at the regional or superior level. Furthermore, the justice points
out that she “did not seek the advice of a lawyer or recourse to the courts in Moldova or
to any of the Human Rights bodies operating in Moldova.” The court also alludes to the
fact that the husband’s actions amount to criminal assault, and the applicant could have
attempted charging him with this. A similar situation occurs in H.A.-R. and S.A.-R.,
where the court ruled, “There is no evidence that state protection was sought and was
unavailable…People cannot expect the state to protect them if they are not prepared to
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invoke state protection.” This emphasis on what applicants could have done demonstrates
a skeptical attitude toward asylum-seekers and an unwillingness to provide protection.
Spain. In Spanish courts, country of origin information is also used to deny asylum
claims, but in a way that is almost opposite to Ireland. Justices use COI to prove that a
population as a whole is at risk, and then proceed to deny protection on the basis that
individual persecution is not present. In certain cases, COI indicates a likelihood of
persecution and the court acknowledges that there is conflict. However, unless the
applicant can prove individual persecution, the case is denied. This is called the “nexus
requirement”—applicants must show that they are being persecuted individually because
of a certain personal quality they possess. Spain is right to consider this, but in certain
cases the consideration appears to be exaggerated. For example, in Recurso No.
4397/2006, a Russian woman fled from persecution by Chechnyan rebels. The court
ruled, “based on the available country of origin information…the alleged facts respond to
a situation of common criminality that affects all of the population and not in particular
those that come from Kazakhstan.”86 A similar ruling was held in Recurso No. 6252/2004
where the court explained, “It is jurisprudential doctrine that a general situation of
internal conflict in a country, including the weakening of state powers and a surge of
uncontrolled groups that can put at risk a person’s most basic human rights, is not by
itself one of the causes that results in recognition as a refugee.” Spanish courts emphasize
individual persecution and even when COI supports an applicant’s fear of persecution,
protection is often denied because the nexus requirement is not satisfied and therefore a
well-founded fear is not proven.
United Kingdom. In determining whether an asylum-seeker’s fear of persecution is wellfounded, the UK’s consideration of the applicant’s evidence often leads to more
favorable outcomes. Unlike Ireland and Spain, country of origin information is
considered along with an applicant’s testimony and both are given equal consideration. In
SA (political activist - internal relocation) Pakistan v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, the court considered the applicant’s own evidence that the police worked
against him based on his political beliefs. The Justice writes in the court’s assessment,
86
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“On the appellant’s own evidence the response of the police on a significant number of
occasions could not remotely be construed as even-handed…It was also the appellant’s
uncontradicted evidence that the police normally sided with the PPP and against the
appellant.” The court makes little mention to COI in this case and appears much more
open to evidence provided by the applicant. Similarly, in SW (lesbians - HJ and HT
applied) Jamaica v. Secretary of State for the Home Department the court gives
substantial consideration to the applicant’s evidence. The layout of the decision supports
this, given that the court first outlines “country guidance conclusions,” which are the
conclusions it can come to based on COI, and then proceeds to the appellant’s case,
which contains subjective information. The UK court analyzes the asylum applicant’s
situation in the context of COI, which benefits the applicant because in some cases his or
her personal situation can be an exception to the more general situation of the country.
Overall, UK courts appear to place more trust in their applicants and are willing to
consider subjective information along with objective evidence. This helps applicants in
proving a well-founded fear of persecution and ultimately results in higher recognition
rates.
Internal Protection Alternative
Ireland. When it comes to the assessment of an internal protection alternative, Ireland
appears to have a restrictive understanding of the phrase “unduly harsh.” For example,
courts do not consider it unduly harsh for an applicant to avoid persecution by keeping
his or her identity hidden upon return to origin country. In C.I.A. v. Minister for Justice,
Equality and Law Reform & Anor, a Nigerian man fled his country and applied for
asylum in Ireland, claiming persecution on the basis of his sexual orientation. The court
stated, “It was open to the Tribunal member to reach the almost unassailable conclusion
that no real difficulties arose for the applicant if his homosexual practices remained
private.” In this case, the court denies protection, claiming that the applicant should not
be persecuted if he keeps his identity hidden. This test is more restrictive than in the UK,
where an asylum-seeker should not be required to conceal his or her identity. Although
this is but one example of a difference in judicial precedent, it is likely that other
differences exist that are preventing favorable outcomes in Irish courts.
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Although interpretation of “unduly harsh” is unfavorable toward applicants, the
High Court does appear to be developing a more liberal approach to the way in which it
assesses IPA. In W.M.M. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal and Another, the High Court
declared that the Refugee Appeals Tribunal erred in its IPA determination. The justice
explained that the Tribunal member must,
have regard to general conditions prevailing in the part of the country of origin to
which relocation is proposed, and this necessitates identifying a specific locality
and carrying out appropriate inquiries to verify that the particular persecution will
not be encountered there, and that it is a place to which the claimant can
reasonably be expected to move without undue hardship. This was not done in the
case.
After this assessment, the court grants leave in the case. In two other cases, FUR v.
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and Another and N.J. v. Refugee Appeals
Tribunal & Anor, the court denies protection because an IPA is available, but a more
thorough assessment was made, which may indicate the adoption of less restrictive
practices. In F.U.R. the court analyzed the particular circumstance of an applicant and
referenced UK case law and guidelines. In N.J., the court considered the applicant’s
family situation, her employment history, and her story on how she traveled to Ireland.
Given these cases, it appears that IPA assessments remain restrictive, but are developing.
Spain. Internal protection alternative is not assessed in many cases and if so, it serves as a
supplementary argument used in denying a claim. In two cases protection was denied, in
part, because an IPA was available. In Recurso No. 1318/2006 the court ruled, “there is
no fact that allows us to conclude that at the present time…internal relocation would not
be sufficient to avoid the persecution that he reports.” Similarly, in Recurso No.
4397/2006 the court stated, “in this case, given the present circumstances, a simple
relocation of the applicants toward more remote zones than that in which they settled
could permit them to elude the persecution that they report.” In both of these cases, IPA
was cited at the end of the decision and used as additional support to deny a claim,
indicating that IPA is not a significant aspect of the asylum determination process in
Spanish courts. These findings are supported by another study, which concluded, “IPA is
something that could be interpreted as being applied as a secondary argument when the
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credibility of the applicant is disputed, or when there is not a well-founded fear of
persecution.”87 The “unduly harsh” standard was not referenced or evaluated in any case.
Due to the limited use of IPA, this variable should not affect recognition rates in Spain.
United Kingdom. Courts in the UK have more liberal standards concerning what
constitutes an “unduly harsh” IPA, which leads to more favorable outcomes for
applicants. Contrary to Ireland, UK courts consider it to be unduly harsh for an applicant
to avoid persecution by keeping his identity hidden upon return to his origin country.
This standard originated in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department and was applied in SW (lesbians - HJ and HT applied) Jamaica v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department, which involved an applicant fleeing
persecution for her sexual orientation. The court granted protection and stated, “…the
appellant impressed us as a calm and credible witness and we believe her firm evidence
that she would not return to living discreetly, whatever the risk.” This standard was also
applied in SA (political activist - internal relocation) Pakistan v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department, which involved persecution based on political opinion. In this
case the court also granted protection and ruled that a person should not have to act
contrary to his normal behavior in order to avoid persecution. Unlike Ireland, it is not
considered reasonable for applicants to conceal their identity. This precedent set by the
Upper Tribunal is evidence that certain IPA standards are more liberal in the UK, giving
applicants a higher chance obtaining protection.
Similar to the assessment of well-founded fear, UK courts also perform a personal
and thorough assessment in determination of internal protection alternative. In KA, AA, &
IK (domestic violence - risk on return) Pakistan v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department protection was denied because there was a viable IPA, but the court
considered a variety of factors in the assessment including: size of country, availability of
IPA, security upon return, health, family situation, personal characteristics, availability of
family assistance, education, and social disgrace. The court justifies its decision after
carefully considering all these aspects of the applicant’s personality and individual
situation. Although protection was denied, this practice of assessing all aspects of an
individual should not be considered restrictive. In this case, if one thing would have been
87
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different, the application could have been approved. In SA, IPA was considered but it was
not regarded as reasonable based on specific aspects of the applicant’s personality. The
court stated, “requiring a political activist to live away from his home area in order to
avoid persecution at the hands of his political opponents has never been considered as a
proper application of the internal relocation principle.”88 The court took great care in
assessing the asylum-seeker’s position in society and what his life would be like upon
return. This generous assessment reflects liberal judicial practice in the UK, which
translates into high recognition rates.
Particular Social Group
Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In the 30 cases included in the study, no asylum
application was denied on the basis that particular social group was not established.
Although Spanish law appears to be more restrictive because it indicates that both tests
must be satisfied, analyses reveal that PSG determination rarely impacts the outcomes of
the cases. This indicates that while particular social group remains an imprecise phrase,
courts have developed an understanding of this term throughout the years—for example,
gender and sexual orientation are well-established PSGs. This allows courts to quickly
establish PSG at the beginning and then proceed with other aspects of a case. As a result,
PSG should not have a significant impact on recognition rates.
DISCUSSION
In 2013 Ireland granted protection to a mere 7% of asylum applicants. Analyses
reveal that, in Ireland, a heavy reliance on country of origin information on top of a
skeptical approach toward applicants overall leads to unfavorable conditions for asylumseekers. Courts use COI to make generalizations about situations in specific countries and
about the asylum seekers coming from those countries. Justices especially focus on state
resources, such as the availability of support from the police or human rights
organizations, and place emphasis on what an applicant could have done before seeking
international protection. As a result, the court does not give due consideration to the
subjective information provided by applicants, which makes it difficult to prove a
reasonable likelihood of persecution. When it comes to the assessment of an internal
protection alternative, precedent remains restrictive but Ireland appears to be developing
88
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a more liberal approach through adopting a more personal assessment. In the ten cases
analyzed, protection was never denied on the basis of particular social group, indicating
that this particular variable rarely impacts case outcomes.
Spain granted protection to 9% of asylum applicants in 2013. Given its civil law
tradition, decisions from Spanish courts are very brief and little explanation is given
behind the ruling, which makes it difficult to analyze judicial practice. However, certain
patterns relating to judicial practice emerge when analyzing multiple decisions. Similar to
Ireland, Spanish courts use COI to emphasize existing outlets of protection in an
applicant’s country of origin. However, unlike Ireland, Spain appears more willing to
acknowledge a likelihood of persecution. This does not necessarily result in more
favorable conditions for asylum seekers— Spain has a tendency to deny protection on the
basis that individual persecution is not present. Therefore, COI is used to reference
situations of conflict, which then allows the court to declare that protection is not
applicable because the population as a whole is at risk. A thorough assessment of IPA
was not present in any of the ten cases analyzed and when referenced, it was always at
the end of the ruling and was not a significant part of the asylum determination process.
Therefore, IPA does not necessarily impact recognition rates. Again, no case was denied
on the basis of particular-social group, so this variable should not have a significant
impact of recognition rates.
In contrast to Ireland and Spain, UK courts complete a very thorough, individual
assessment of each asylum seeker and his or her specific situation, which often works in
favor of the applicant and explains the UK’s high recognition rate of 29%. Unlike in
Ireland, country of origin information is considered in conjunction with the subjective
information provided by the applicant. Reference to the evidence provided by applicants
demonstrates a willingness on behalf of the court to give due consideration to the asylumseeker’s side of the story. IPA assessments are also liberal and always involve an
assessment of an individual’s situation. Lastly, protection was never denied on the basis
of particular social group, indicating that this particular variable rarely impacts case
outcomes.
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CONCLUSION
After analysis of the case law, it can be concluded that differences in judicial
practice impact the outcomes of asylum cases, and therefore recognition rates. In light of
these conclusions, future studies that can more systematically analyze judicial practice
would be beneficial. A broader sample of cases may lead to a better understanding of
judicial practice relating to each variable. Furthermore, a study that analyzes the
reasoning behind a large number of rejected applications would be beneficial to see
whether a court consistently denies claims on the same ground. This study could not
control for all causal factors or even all aspects of judicial practice, but the results
indicate that judicial practice is one explanation for the variation in asylum recognition
rates. Domestic laws and even judicial precedent can be changed so that all states have
the same standards, but application and interpretation of these standards is what makes
the real difference. Therefore, future efforts to harmonize the asylum determination
process should focus on the specific practices of courts if real progress is to be made.
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